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"! understand as well as any one what people are saying . . . . But I can only 
do my duty by my client to the best of my judgment."1 So says Sir William 
Patterson, the hero of Anthony Trollope's novel Lady Anna, at a time when he 
has come under severe criticism. He has just behaved in what seems a most 
unlawyerly fashion: he has persuaded his client to drop a case that, if successful, 
would have been worth a good deal of money. He has done so, the Bar believes, 
because "[i]n lieu of regarding his client, he had taken upon himself to set things 
right in general, according to his idea of right."' As Lady Anna unfolds, 
however, it turns out that Sir William has been lookiog out both for "right in 
general" and for his client, on whom the opposing party later voluntarily settles a 
* Sharswood Fellow, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I thank the American Inns 
of Court and their panel of reviewers, Stephen Gillers, Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Nancy J. Moore, and 
Robert M. Wilcox, for the Warren E. Burger Prize. I also thank Sarah E. Merkle, Adam J. Hegler, 
Carlyle R. Cromer, and other editors of the South Carolina Law Review. 
1. ANTHONY TROLLOPE, LADY ANNA 324 (Stephen Orgel ed., Oxford Univ. Press World's 
Classic ed. 1990) (1874) [hereinafter LADY ANNA]. 
2. Id. at 323. 
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large sum of money. By moving the parties from litigation to trustful 
reciprocity, Sir William brings about the best possible outcome. 
Although Trollope wrote Lady Anna in 1874, his portrayal of Sir William 
has great relevance today. There is perennial debate among legal ethicists about 
how lawyers should balance their duties to their clients with their responsibilities 
as moral persons within society3 In Lady Anna, Trollope reminds us that while 
this debate is an important one, there are also times when farsighted lawyers can 
fulfill their duties to their clients in ways that benefit everyone involved. 
This Essay looks at one possible way that lawyers can achieve such 
outcomes. Under certain circumstances, lawyers can best serve both their clients 
and the broader good by practicing what I call the ethic of high expectations. A 
lawyer acting from the ethic of high expectations gives advice that will be fully 
effective only if both the lawyer's client and the other party voluntarily and 
independently relinquish legal rights in order to further the broader good. The 
lawyer succeeds by shifting the conversation from being about legal rights to 
being about right outcomes. 
In defining and advocating the ethic of high expectations, I rely on two very 
different types of sources. The first is Lady Anna. Although Trollope's Orley 
Farm has fascinated present-day legal ethicists with its portrayals of lawyers,< 
Lady Anna has received virtually no attention. 5 Part I outlines the plot of Lady 
Anna and introduces the wonderful Sir William Patterson. Part II then analyzes 
Sir William's choices from a legal ethics standpoint. More specifically, this Part 
uses Sir William's conduct to frame the concept of the ethic of high expectations 
and further argues that, for the most part, this conduct would pass muster under 
the legal ethics regimes prevalent in the United States today. 
3. See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAzARD, JR., ETIDCS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 12()-35 (1978) 
(noting that a lawyer needs "extraordinary technical skill [and] an unusually disciplined sense of 
probity" if he is to «be at once a champion in the forensic roughness and a guardian of the temple of 
justice"); DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 19-64 (2007) (discussing tension 
between "the morality of conscience" and "the claim that professional obligation can override it"); 
GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 24-{;1 (2d ed. 1860) (taking up 
question of "what are the limits of [a lawyer's] duty when the legal demands or interests of his 
client conflict with his own sense of what is just and right"). 
4. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 3, at 302 ("[Orley Farm] is a great novel about legal ethics 
.... "); Sanford H. Kadish, Moral Excess in the Law, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 63, 64 (2000) 
(describing Orley Farm as a "fine Victorian novel"); Thomas Shaffer, The Profession as a Moral 
Teacher, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 195, 209 (1986) ("My favorite legal example of contempt for the 
profession as moral teacher occurred ... in Trollope's Orley Farm."); W. Bradley Wendel, Legal 
Ethics as "Political Moralism" or the Morality of Politics, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1413, 1427-28 
(2008) (commenting on Troll ope's characters from Orley Farm). 
5. Lady Anna has won occasional praise in the legal world, but this praise dates far back in 
the past. See, e.g., Henry Drinker, The Lawyers of Anthony Trol/ope, in HENRYS. DRINKER, Two 
ADDRESSES DELIVERED TO MEMBERS OF THE GROLIER CLUB (1950), reprinted in FED. LAW., Jan. 
2008, at 50, 56-58 (discussing the character of Lady Anna's Sir William Patterson); John H 
Wigmore, A List of Legal Novels, 2 ILL. L. REV. 574, 592 (1908) (noting ''Novel[s] in which a 
lawyer, most of all, ought to be interested" and including Lady Anna on his list). 
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A lawyer practicing the ethic of high expectations must have a client willing 
to act with good will toward the other party-and willing to gamble that the 
other party will reciprocate. Part III turns to a very different set of sources to 
show why clients might be willing to act in this way. In particular, this Part 
draws upon insights developed from experiments in the field of economics, 
particularly behavioral economics, regarding people's preferences for fairness 
and reciprocity and the ways in which their market norms relate to their social 
norms. Part III argues that these insights both support tbe feasibility of the ethic 
of high expectations under certain circumstances and enrich tbe understanding of 
how it can be sustained in practice. 
Finally, Part IV considers the circumstances under which lawyers today 
could practice the ethic of high expectations. This Part does not suggest that the 
ethic of high expectations will work in all or indeed many cases. Nonetheless, 
the ethic of high expectations is underutilized, whether from lawyers' disinterest 
in thinking "outside the box," desire for business, fear of malpractice suits, or 
other motives. Part IV accordingly identifies characteristics of cases and areas of 
law where the ethic of high expectations might prove appropriate. 
I. TROLLOPE'S SOLICITOR-GENERAL 
A. Lady Anua in Brief 
Lady Anna begins grimly. The nefarious Lord Love] marries a young 
woman but tires of her shortly before the birth of their daughter Anna. He tells 
his lady that their marriage is a farce-that he has a prior wife already in Italy. It 
is unclear whether he is telling the truth, but his lady has no reliable way of 
verifying or refuting his claim. Lord Love! then leaves England to live on the 
Continent. In his absence, his lady does everything she can to emphasize the 
validity of their marriage, including insisting that she be called the "Countess" 
and that Anua be known as "Lady" Anna. During these years, the Countess and 
Anua are taken in by a kindly tailor, Thomas Thwaite, who devotes a great deal 
of time and money to helping them. 
Fast forward twenty years to Lord Lovel's death. Lord Lovel's title and 
modest landed property pass to his nearest male relative, whom I shall refer to as 
the young Earl, but it is unclear who will inherit his fabled wealth. Once some 
dust has settled, two viable claimants remain: Anua and the young Earl
6 
Anna 
will inherit if she is legitimate, and the young Earl will inherit otherwise. The 
burden of proof is on the young Earl. 
6. Two other possible claimants appear at various times. One is Lord Lovel's mistress at 
the time of his death-an Italian woman to whom he leaves his money in his will. See LADY ANNA, 
supra note 1, at 15-16. The will is invalidated on the grounds of insanity in the second chapter of 
Lady Anna, and that is the last we hear of this claimant. !d. at 20. The remaining claimant is a 
(different) Italian woman who claims to have married Lord Lovel before he "married" the Countess. 
See id. at 42--43. Her proofs of this marriage are extremely dubious. See id. at 42-44. 
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At this point, Trollope introduces the lawyers-and there is no shortage of 
them. For Anna, we have Mr. Goffe as solicitor and Mr. Mainsail as junior 
barrister, while the lead barrister, Serjeant Bluestone, is "a very violent man, 
taking up all his cases as though the very holding of a brief opposite to him was 
an insult to himself."7 For the young Earl, who has the deeper pockets, we have 
more prestigious lawyers: Mr. Flick the solicitor, Mr. Hardy, Q.C., as second 
barrister, and Sir William Patterson, the Solicitor·General of England, as lead 
barrister.' The case appears headed to court, as the Countess (who acts as 
Anna's guardian) has angrily rejected an offer that Anna's claim oflegitimacy be 
abandoned in exchange for 30,000 pounds. 
Mr. Flick goes to Italy to investigate the case. He returns with the unhappy 
impression that Anna is in fact legitimate. Some evidence suggests that Lord 
Love! did have a prior wife in Italy, but the evidence further indicates, though 
not conclusively, that this woman died before Lord Love! married the Countess. 
Mr. Flick relays this information in guarded terms to Sir William. They 
conclude that the best result for their client will be for him to marry Anna. This 
will settle the suit and provide the young Earl with all the wealth he could hope 
to win. Anna will go along, they reason, because this approach would give her 
the certainty of her wealth, undisputed legal and social acceptance of her 
legitimacy, and a share in the young Earl's title and land. After some difficulties 
with Serjeant Bluestone, who has "never heard anything more irregular in [his] 
life,"9 they put the idea to the parties. 
The young Earl, who is decent, attractive, and tractable, is willing enough, 
and the snobbish Countess is positively thrilled by the idea. But Anna initially 
resists. She likes the young Earl, but she has a prior secret engagement to Daniel 
Thwaite, a tailor who is the son of Thomas Thwaite. The rest of the book turns 
on two questions: First, will Anna's resistance continue; and second, how will 
the inheritance dispute be resolved? The answer to the first question is a rather 
tedious yes. It is the second question that keeps the reader-or at least the 
lawyer reader-turning the pages eagerly. 
7. !d. at48. 
8. Prior to the 1890s, the Solicitor-General of England could take cases in private practice in 
addition to his work for the Crown. See Walter Preston Armstrong, A Famous English K.C., 29 
YALEL.J. 718,727 (1920). 
9. LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 87 (internal quotation marks omitted). A letter from 
Anna's lawyers to the young Earl's lawyers expressed a similar sentiment: 
Should the Earl of Love! seek the hand of his cousin, the Lady Anna Love!, and marry 
her ... , we should be delighted at such a family anangement; but we do not think that 
we, as lawyers,-or, if we may be allowed to say so, that you as lawyers,-have anything 
to do with such a matter. 
Jd at 69. Mr. Hardy also resisted this approach, feeling that "it wasn't law." Id at 92. 
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B. The Unconventional Sir William Patterson 
So far, the character of Sir William is understandable enough. He is an 
exceptionally able lawyer, blessed with "the gift of seeing through darkness."10 
He has the judgment to recognize a weak case and the imagination to identify a 
clever, if unusual, solution. He has the energy and confidence to pursue this 
solution despite the resistance of the other lawyers. Indeed, he is not above 
bending the rules a little: when Setjeant Bluestone refuses to put the marriage 
idea to his client, Sir William goes behind his back through a third party. And 
while affable, Sir William also has an advocate's edge, as shown when he 
delicately warns the (poorer) other side that "if the law be allowed to take its 
course" then the matter "may,-I fear it must,-take years to prove."11 With his 
brilliance, his common sense, and his persuasiveness, he gains the respect of 
almost all the interested non-lawyers. Not long after Sir William suggests a 
settlement by marriage, the Countess has "already begun to have more faith in 
the Solicitor-General than in [her own lawyers] Mr. Goffe [and] Serjeant 
Bluestone."12 
But when Anna's resistance to marrying the young Earl becomes clear, Sir 
William shows an unconventional side. On a personal level, he is the only 
person with any sympathy for Anna's insistence that she will marry the lowly 
Daniei. 13 On a professional level, he acts in what seems like a very unlawyerly 
way: he persuades the young Earl to abandon his legal claim to the money. At 
the scheduled court hearing, Sir William argues that Anna is in fact legitimate 
and that judgment should be entered in her favor. This outrages the young Earl's 
nearest relative, the rector of Y oxham, who goes "about declaring that the 
interests of the Love! family had been sacrificed by their own counsel."14 And 
the rector is not alone: 
10. !d. at 46. 
11. LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 66 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
12. LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 88. 
13. The Countess is horrified to the point of abusiveness at the thought of Anna marrying 
Daniel. See id. at 213. As for the other lawyers, the following exchange sums it up: 
"The marriage would be too incongruous," said Mr. Hardy. 
"Quite horrible," said the Seljeant. 
"It distresses one to think of it," said Mr. Gaffe. 
"It would be much better that she should not be Lady Anna at all [i.e., legitimate], if 
she is to do that," said Mr. Mainsail. 
"Very much better," said Mr. Flick, shaking his head, and remembering that he was 
employed by [the young Earl] and not by the Countess-a fact of which it seemed to him 
that the Solicitor-General altogether forgot the importance. 
"Gentlemen, you have no romance among you," said Sir William. "Have not 
generosity and valour always prevailed over wealth and rank with ladies in story?" 
!d. at318. 
14. Id. at 323. 
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There were very many who ... agreed with the rector in thinking 
that the Earl's case had been mismanaged. There was surely enough of 
ground for a prolonged fight to have enabled the Love! party to have 
driven their opponents to a compromise. There was a feeling that the 
Solicitor-General had been carried away by some romantic idea of 
abstract right, and had acted in direct opposition to all the usages of 
forensic advocacy as established in England. What was it to him 
whether the Countess were or were not a real Countess? It had been his 
duty to get what he could for the Earl, his client. There had been much 
to get, and with patience no doubt something might have been got. But 
he had gotten nothing. Many thought that he had altogether cut his own 
throat, and that he would have to take the first "puny" judgeship vacant. 
"He is a great man,-a very great man indeed," said the Attorney-
General, in answer to someone who was abusing Sir William. "There is 
not one of us can hold a candle to him. But, then, as I have always said, 
he ought to have been a poet!"15 
Despite all the criticism, Sir William's choice proves inspired. Anna 
eventually offers half of her wealth to the young Earl. With Sir William's 
approval, he accepts the gift. Sir William's work does not stop here, however. 
He then persuades the young Earl to host the wedding of Anna and Daniel 
"exactly as though [the young Earl's family was] all proud of the connection."" 
Sir William further persuades Daniel (who has a proud Radical side) to accept 
this arrangement. The book closes with the wedding, and even here "[t]he hero 
of the day was the Solicitor-General."17 Sir William has manufactured the best 
possible outcome. 18 The young Earl now has money to support his title-
something that Trollope, who was no radical, presumably viewed as a socially 
valuable outcome.19 Anna has Daniel, substantial wealth, and undisputed 
legitimacy. Finally, the two sides have developed a warm family relationship. 
While an arms-length settlement could have achieved some of these outcomes, it 
seems impossible that such a settlement could have resulted in the young Earl's 
getting so much money, in Anna's legitimacy being as widely accepted socially, 
15. Id. at 348. 
16. I d. at 493. 
17. Id. at 507. 
18. Once all is said and done, Sir William receives much praise. See id at 508. His client is 
thrilled, observing that "[i]fwe had gone on quarrelling and going to law. where should I have been 
now? I should never have got a shilling out' of the property." !d. at 489 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Pleasingly, however, Trollope leaves one dissenter: the rector of Yoxham remains 
convinced to his dying day that "[i]f the lawyers had persevered as they ought to have done, it 
would have been found out that the Countess was no Countess, that the Lady Anna was no Lady 
Anna, and that all the money had belonged by right to the [yotmg] Earl." Id. at 495 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
19. See ANfHONY TROLLOP£, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 142 (Univ. Cal. Press 1947) (1883) 
(displaying a distinct preference for the upper class). 
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and in the two ending up with such a cordial cousinly relationship. Sir William 
has brought happiness beyond what the law could have provided. 
II. SIR WILLIAM DECONSTRUCTED 
Why does Sir William act the way he does? Why does he persuade his 
client to abandon a suit that has some chance of success? In hindsight, the 
choice is a brilliant one, but at the time it seems like a most improbable decision. 
In this Part, I first explore what motivates Sir William to act as he does and 
argue that he acts primarily from his sense of duty to his client, although this is 
leavened with a strong desire for a good outcome all around. This Part then 
turns to the question of how Sir William achieves his motives and argues that, in 
choosing to drop the suit, he relies on what I call the ethic of high expectations. 
Finally, this Part considers whether Sir William's ethic of high expectations 
would pass muster under the ethical rules prevalent in the United States today. 
A. The Motives of Sir William 
Sir William's decision to drop the lawsuit "in direct opposition to all the 
usages of forensic advocacy"20 lies at the heart of Lady Anna. It is a puzzling 
choice, but the text suggests four possible motives. 
First, Sir William at one point suggests that the decision is not his: he is 
simply following the instructions of the young Earl, who is convinced that Anna 
is in fact legitimate.21 This explanation does not seem compelling, however, in 
light of all the influence that Sir William has over his extraordinarily docile 
client. The young Earl is "inclined to be submissive in everything to his great 
adviser"22 and throughout the novel he follows Sir William's advice. If the 
young Earl has instructed Sir William to drop the case, it is because Sir William 
has advised him to do so. 
Second, there is the possibility that Anna will still come around and marry 
the young Earl (a possibility that surely would have been lost had the young Earl 
persisted in legally disputing her legitimacy). Perhaps due to hasty drafting,23 
20. LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 348. 
21. See id. at 324 (explaining to Mr. Hardy that "[l]et an advocate be ever so obdurate, he can 
hardly carry on a case in opposition to his client's instructions" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
22. !d. at 437. 
23. A quick writer and a light editor, Trollope frequently has inconsistencies in his writings. 
See VICTORIA GLENDINNING, TROLLOPE 331 (1992) ("Critics complained of carelessness and 
infelicities of style and grammar."); TROLLOPE, supra note 19, at 287 ("Every word of [Lady Anna) 
was written at sea ... and was done ... for eight weeks, at the rate of 66 pages of manuscript in 
each week, every page of manuscript containing 250 words."). Lady Anna itself contains obvious 
inconsistencies. See Drinker, supra note 5, at 58 (describing inconsistencies in Trollope's portrayal 
of Sir William's character). Compare LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 190 (describing how Sir 
William shows full knowledge of the debt owed by the Countess to Thomas Thwaitc), with id. at 
I 
I' 
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Trollope offers conflicting accounts of Sir William's views here. At one point 
late in the book, Sir William holds out hope that this marriage will happen after 
all24 But immediately after the trial, Sir William expresses grave doubts about 
the likelihood of this marriage-he observes that Anna "seems to have a will of 
her own, and that will is bent the other way."25 This observation seems truer to 
Sir William's usual perspicuity than does the passage in which Trollope 
describes Sir William as holding out hope for the marriage. Because of this-
and because the decision to drop the case is more interesting if Sir William has 
low hopes for a marriage-! consider that the prospect of a marriage between the 
cousins did not substantially motivate Sir William's decision to abandon the 
lawsuit. 
Third, there is the motive that the rector of Y oxham and the profession at 
large attribute to Sir William: that he acts out of "some romantic idea of abstract 
light. "26 This motive is more plausible. Throughout Lady Anna, Sir William 
displays sympathy and understanding toward all persons concerned in the case. 
He comes to believe that Anna is, in truth, legitimate and asks "[ w ]ho would 
wish to rob the girl of her noble name and great inheritance if she be the heiress? 
Not I, though the [young] Earl be my client."27 Perhaps Sir William persuades 
his client to give up his lawsuit simply because it is the morally right thing to do. 
Fourth, there is the possibility that Sir William is just doing what lawyers 
ordinarily do-acting in the best interest of his client. On this theory, Sir 
William has made a calculated determination that the young Earl has a better 
chance of financial success if he drops the suit and trusts Anna's generosity than 
if he pursues the suit. Again, this motive is plausible. Sir William does not 
think much of his client's odds at trial, and he is aware that Anna may be 
generous. Just after the decision to drop the suit, he observes that "! do think 
that a settlement may be made of the property which shall be very much in the 
[young] Earl's favour."28 
There are two plausible motives, then: that Sir William acts out of some 
romantic idea of abstract right and that he acts to further the best interests of his 
client. These two motives ultimately prove compatible in this case, and Sir 
William seems to have a healthy dose of each. But which motivation is pdmary? 
As an author, Trollope is celebrated for his ability to leave interesting questions 
open for his readers to wrestle with,29 and this is one of those questions. Cdtics 
317 (describing how Sir William first learns of the amount of the debt owed by the Countess to 
Thomas Thwaite). 
24. See LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 413-14 (describing Sir William as "still of [the] 
opinion that the two cousins might ultimately become man and wife if matters were left tranquil and 
the girl were taken abroad for a year or two"). 
25. I d. at 325 (intemal quotation marks omitted). 
26. I d. at 348. 
27. Id. at 92 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
28. Id. at 325 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
29. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 3, at 318, 328 (arguing that in Orley Farm, Trollope takes 
an "agnostic" stance on core moral questions related to the main character's forgery of a codicil to a 
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of Lady Anna have taken different views on the issue. English professor R.D. 
McMaster reads Sir William as motivated mainly by the greater good.30 He 
argues that "[t]he complaints of [Sir William's] colleagues, that he appeals to 
'the light of his own reason', to 'his idea of right', to 'something of his own', 
indicate that, unlike most Trollopian lawyers, and in accord with Trollope's 
ideals, [Sir William] consults an inner light of truth."31 By contrast, Henry 
Drinker, a mid-twentieth-century Philadelphia lawyer, legal ethicist, and 
Trollo~ian,32 portrays Sir William as focused primarily on the interests of his 
client. 3 
Sir William was not only able to look into the future, but having done 
so, could weigh accurately the different alternatives, with but one 
consideration-the best interest of his clients; never permitting the 
gaudium certaminis-the craving to accomplish the immediate 
objective-to divert him from his primary duty to serve the client. 
. . . [Sir William] knew that he might rely on Lady Anna's 
generosity, on the adequacy of the estate to care for them all, and on 
Lady Anna's pride in her family, as appealing forces which would 
induce her to make adequate provision for the head of the family, so that 
the title might be supported witl1 becoming dignity and splendor.34 
The practicing lawyer Drinker thus takes Sir William as focused 
primarily on his client's interest,35 while the English professor McMaster 
reads Sir William as motivated mainly by a sense ofright.36 
will and subsequent confession); William H. Simon, The Past, Present, and Future of Legal Ethics: 
Three Comments for David Luban, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1365, 1372 (2008) (considering that Orley 
Farm is best read as leaving in equipoise the tension between legal and moral norms); cf R.D. 
MCMASTER, TROLLOPE AND THE LAW 6 (1986) ("As many scholars have observed, however, 
[Trollope's] novels are singular for the degree to which they sympathetically present all sides of an 
issue .... "). 
30. See MCMASTER, supra note 29, at 131. 
3!. Id. 
32. See Austin W. Scott, Book Review, 64 HARV. L. REV. 522, 522 (1951) (describing 
Drinker's background as a Trollopian). See generally HENRYS. DRINKER, LEGAL ETIIICS (1953) 
("To many lawyers it has . , . seemed essential that om lawyers and law students should have a 
modem book on [legal ethics] which would apply the eternal principles to present conditions, 
embody those dealing with the new developments, ... and also make available a summary of the 
principles established by the many written decisions which have been rendered during the past thirty 
years by the ethics committees of the different bar associations construing the Canons."). 
33. See Drinker, supra note 5, at 56---57. 
34. I d. at 57. 
35. See id. at 50, 56~ 57. 
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In my view, the two motives are closely connected. I agree with Drinker 
that Sir William's primary motivation is his duty to his client. After all, Sir 
William himself says so, telling Mr. Hardy that "I understand as well as any one 
what people are saying . . . . But I can only do my duty by my client to the best 
of my judgment."37 But it is Sir William's sense of abstract right that enables 
him to form the view that dropping the suit will be good for his client. This 
sense tells him in the first instance that Anna should be recognized as legitimate. 
It tells him more, however-it also tells him that it would be good for the young 
Earl to have some money to support his title and for the family members to be on 
harmonious terms with each other. Once Sir William has come to this broad 
vision of abstract right, he recognizes that it will be in his client's best interests 
to achieve it, and he acts accordingly. His moral sense has thus shaped his 
judgment as to how he can best serve his client. 
B. The Ethic of High Expectations 
When his initial idea of resolution by marriage fails, Sir William has the 
greatness to imagine a fallback solution that is good for all parties and satisf'ying 
in the abstract. Perhaps even more impressively, however, he brings this 
solution to pass. He does not do so through the conventional machinery of law 
or settlement. Instead, he practices what I will call "the ethic of high 
expectations": he gives advice that will only be effective if his client and the 
other party voluntarily and independently relinquish legal rights in order to 
further the broader good. Sir William's vision will only come true if the young 
Earl abandons his legal suit, if Anna then offers the young Earl money, and if the 
young Earl then treats Anna and Daniel as family. There is no contractual tit-
for-tat in these exchanges; instead, each party acts honorably and generously, 
trusting that the other party will in tum be honorable and generous. 
I use the term "ethic" to reflect the fact that, as discussed in the prior section, 
Sir William's course of action is rooted in a view not only of what is good for his 
client, but also of what satisfies the broader good. This is an imprecise use of the 
word, but it captures the moral force of Sir William's vision. It also conveys the 
point that Sir William's "high expectations" for the parties are rooted in his 
confidence in his vision. Sir William gambles that the fundamental rightness of 
his vision will be evident to his client and to Anna as well. He himself has 
stepped away fi·om the role of a lawyer, read narrowly, and he trusts that the 
young Earl and Anna will similarly step out of their roles as clients interested 
only in what they can get. He has asked them to abandon litigation and hard-
nosed settlement negotiations in favor of fairness and trust. 
Sir William does not practice the ethic of high expectations in a vacuum. By 
the time he persuades the young Earl to drop the suit, he has had a chance to 
36. See MCMASTER, supra note 29, at 131. 
37. LADY ANNA, supra note I, at 324. 
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observe both parties. He knows that the young Earl is a decent sort, and one who 
will respect his advice. He has some sense of Anna's personality as well. Her 
decision to stand by Daniel rather than accept the very appealing young Earl 
suggests not only that she is true to her word, but also that she honors her debts 
(for Daniel's father Thomas supported Anna and the Countess for many years) . 
Sir William also !mows that, despite the bad blood between the two branches of 
the family, Anna and the young Earl have grown to like and respect each other as 
individuals. The young Earl finds Anna beautiful and appealing,38 while Anna 
considers the young Earl "not a lover, but simply the pleasantest friend that 
fortune had ever sent her."39 
These factors no doubt influence Sir William's willingness to rely on the 
ethic of high expectations. Nonetheless, Anna is not Sir William's client and he 
has no control over her actions. In trusting her generosity, Sir William is making 
a bold gamble. While Drinker thinks that Sir William "knew" that Lady Anna 
would end up giving the young Earl money,'0 I think this point is less certain and 
thus more interesting. Sir William himself only says that he thinks this "may" 
happen41 He is betting on Anna's ethical sense, but he knows that he is betting. 
His decision to take a chance and trust to the decency of the other party is so 
unusual that it flummoxes both the other attorneys around him and non-law 
onlookers like the rector ofYoxham. 
C. The Ethics of the Ethic of High Expectations 
In Sir William's day, barristers absorbed their ethical training durin§ 
pupilages at the Inns of Court and did not practice under written ethical codes.4 
By contrast, lawyers in the United States today typically act subject to state-
based written rules of ethics.43 In this section, I consider whether Sir William's 
ethic of high expectations would pass muster under these rules, since only if that 
is the case can this ethic have practical relevance for American lawyers today. 
More specifically, I evaluate Sir William's actions in relation to the American 
38. See id. at 242-43. 
39. Id at 155. 
40. Drinker, supra note 5, at 57. 
41. LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 325. 
42. See Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year Evolution, 57 
SMU L. REV. 1385, 1401 (2004) (citing Anthony Thornton, The Professional ResponsibUity and 
Ethics of the English Bar, in LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 53, 55 {Ross 
Cranston ed., 1995)). Not unti11980 did English barristers have a written code of conduct. See id 
at l402n.l31. 
43. See Links to Other Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Pages, A.B.A., 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/links.htmi#States (last visited Dec. 12, 2010) (providing links to the state 
ethics codes). 
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Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules), since 
most state rules are based on these Model Rules.44 
The Model Rules recognize that lawyers can act in various roles, each of 
which gives rise to different obligations. Lawyers can have single clients, they 
can act for multiple clients, or they can be third-party neutrals, such as arbitrators 
or mediators.45 Sir William fits readily into the first category. Although his 
sympathy and vision give him a whiff of acting more broadly, as a formal matter 
he is a lawyer with one client-the young Earl-and must be evaluated as 
such46 
For lawyers acting for clients, the Model Rules prioritize "the lawyer's 
obligation zealously to protect and pursue a client's legitimate interests, within 
the bounds of the law."47 This position is by no means as absolute as Lord 
Brougham's famous dictum that "an advocate, in the discharge of his duty, 
knows but one person in all the world, and that person is his client,"48 but it 
undeniably takes a client-centric approach.49 Lawyers are there to look out for 
their clients' legitimate interests, whether or not these interests are compatible 
with what I am terming (admittedly loosely) the broader good. Of course, 
lawyers can try to shape their clients' understandings of their interests. Model 
Rule 2.1 advises that "[i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise 
independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering 
advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as 
moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's 
44. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Dates of Adoption, A.B.A., 
http;//www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/alpha_states.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2010) (providing a list of 
dates when states adopted the Model Rules and showing California as the only state absent from the 
list); Proposed Rules of Professional Conduct, ST. B. OF CALI., http://www.calbar.org/ 
proposedrules (last visited Dec. 12, 2010) (covering proposed revisions to the California Rules). 
45. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, 2.4 (2010). 
46. Sir William is thus distinct from what Justice Brandeis called a "lawyer for the situation," 
see HAZARD, supra note 3, at 58-59, and what, prior to its deletion in 2002, Model Rule 2.2. 
described as the role of "intermediary," compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.2 cmt. 
(2000) (amended 2002) (discussing the situation where a lawyer "represents two or more patiies 
with potentially conflicting interests" and "seek[s] to establish or adjust a relationship between 
clients on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis"), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L 
CONDUCT R. 2.2 (2010) (indicating that the rule was deleted in 2002). Nonetheless, Sir William 
acts rather like Geoffrey Hazard's ideal of a "lawyer for the situation"-he undertakes "forms of 
intercession suggested by the models of wise parent or village elder" and acts "on implicit 
principles of decision that express commonly shared ideals in behavior rather than strict legal right." 
HAZARD, supra note 3, at 64---62; see also David Luban, Heroic Judging in an Antiheroic Age, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 2064, 2067 (1997) ("[T]he lawyer for the situation ... seem[s] to be stretching the 
conventional defmition of [the] role[], almost to the edge of legitimacy."). Hazard seems to view 
these modes of acting as limited to the "lawyer for the situation," see HAZARD, supra note 3, at 61-
67, while I suggest in this Essay that, under certain circumstances, a lawyer with a specific type of 
client can undertake them. 
47. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. para 9 (2010). 
48. 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 3 (1874). 
49. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 159 (1988). 
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situation."50 But when push comes to shove, the "lawyer shall abide by a client's 
decisions conceming the objectives of representation. "51 
As discussed earlier, Trollope leaves open whether Sir William considers his 
primary obligation to be to his client or to achieving a just outcome. If the latter, 
then Sir William's conduct would not be in keeping with the client-centric 
approach that animates the Model Rules. As I argued in the prior section, 
however, I read Sir William as prioritizing his duty to his client. While he has a 
vision of the broader good-and a decided preference for giving advice of the 
non-legal sort that is included in Model Rule 2.1 52-he believes that he is 
pursuing the interests of the young Earl to the best of his abilities. His greatness 
comes not from disregarding the client-centric model of lawyering (a model that 
I do not question in this Essay) but rather from achieving his client's objectives 
by using the ethic of high expectations. 
Not only does Sir William satisfY the general balance struck in the Model 
Rules between a lawyer's duty to his client and to broader principles, but he also 
conducts himself in keeping with most of the more specific Model Rules. He is 
diligent and prompt in accordance with Model Rule 1.353 -even breaking up an 
August trip to retum to London to meet with his client.54 He communicates 
amply with the young Earl as called for under Model Rule 1.4.55 He is a little 
loose about client confidences, but his behavior may still pass muster under 
Model Rule 1.6.56 He has no conflicts of interest that might violate Model Rule 
1.7.57 
50. MODEL RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2010). 
51. MODEL RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2010). 
52. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2010). 
53. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 {2010) ("A lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client."). 
54. See LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 188-89. 
55. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2010) ("A lawyer shall ... promptly 
inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed 
consent ... is required by these Rules .... ");LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 190--91 (discussing his 
plan for the case with the young Earl). 
56. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2010) ("A lawyer shall not reveal 
information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent .... "). 
This issue arises after Anna tells the young Earl about her secret engagement to Daniel. See LADY 
ANNA, supra note 1, at 166. The young Earl requests Anna's permission to tell Sir William about 
this, but implies that he does not intend to tell anyone else. ld at 186. Upon heating the news, Sir 
William "disregarded altogether his client's injunctions as to secrecy," feeling that "in a matter of so 
great importance it behoved him to look to his client's interests, rather than his client's 
instructions." Jd. at 204. On its face, this incident seems contrary to Model Rule l.6's bar on a 
lawyer's "reveal[ing] information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives 
informed consent [or] the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to cany out the 
representation." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2010). But Sir William has explicitly 
warned the young Earl that he will disclose this information, telling the ymmg Earl that "[t]he 
matter is too heavy for secrets." LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 192. The Earl's silence in the face of 
this warning, see id., combined with Sir William's need to reveal the information thus could well 
amount to an implied authorization under Rule 1.6. In any event, the incident is not crucial to the 
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In at least one respect, however, Sir William's conduct sits uneasily with the 
requirements of the Model Rules. The Model Rules set forth clear constraints on 
communications between an attorney for one client and other parties. Model 
Rule 4.2 bars a lawyer from communicating with a represented party without the 
permission of that party's attomey,58 and Model Rule 4.3 requires that a lawyer 
neither imply disinterest in the case when communicating with non-represented 
third parties nor give advice to persons whose interests have a reasonable 
possibility of conflicting with his client's interests. 59 Sir William pushes the 
boundaries of these rules-and in some instances violates them-in the course of 
his constant communications with all interested parties. Early in Lady Anna, he 
acts in a way that would violate Model Rule 4.2 by going behind Serjeant 
Bluestone's back to put the idea of settlement-by-marriage to Anna via an 
intermediary.60 He does this after Serjeant Bluestone has refused to put the idea 
of settlement-by-marriage to Anna (a refusal that in tum would amount to a 
violation of Model Rule 1.4(a)(l)).61 With regard to non-represented parties 
such as the Countess and Daniel, Sir William does not repudiate their views of 
him as an honest broker, which indeed in some sense he is. He also doles out 
advice to them, although this occurs after the young Earl has formally abandoned 
his legal claim to the money. 62 
Lawyers practicing under the Model Rules cannot duplicate Sir William's 
free-wheeling approach to communications with other parties. At the very least, 
a lawyer today would have to clear any communications with the opposing party 
with that party's counsel,"' clarify her interests to non-represented parties,6 and 
avoid advising parties with potential conflicts. 65 These obligations do not 
directly conflict with the ethic of high expectations, but they do make it harder 
plot, and the secret itself is hardly the usual client confidence since it is the secret of Anna (the 
opposing party) rather than the young Earl. 
57. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2010) (providing guidelines for lawyers 
"if the representation [of a client] involves a concurrent conflict of interest"). 
58. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2010) ("In representing a client, a 
lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer 
lmows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the 
other lawyer .... "). 
59. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2010). 
60. See LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 69-71, 81-82. Comment 4 to Model Rule 4.2 specifies 
that "[a] lawyer may not make a communication prohibited by this Rule through the acts of 
another." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 4.2 cmt. 4 (2010). 
61. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. 2 (2010) ("[A] lawyer who receives 
from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy ... must promptly infmm the 
client of its substance .... ");LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 68-69. Eventually, Serjeant Bluestone 
is so overwhelmed by Sir William that he consents in allowing Sir William to communicate directly 
with Anna. See LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 240--41,277. 
62. See LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at428, 499-502, 
63. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2010). 
64. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2010). 
65. See MODEL RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2010). 
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for a lawyer to get a handle on the character of the opposing party and to 
communicate the lawyer's vision of a just solution to all the interested parties. 
I will come back to this point later in this Essay,"6 but first I take up a more 
fundamental concern, one that lies at the border of ethics and practicality. Model 
Rule 1.1 requires that "[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a 
client."
67 
In hindsight, at least, it is plain that Sir William provides his client 
with more than competent representation. The young Earl ends up rich and is 
very pleased with the outcome. But Sir William and his client are fictional, and 
Sir William succeeds by throwing a court case. If the ethic of high expectation is 
to work in reality-in other words, if it can indeed be practiced by competent 
lawyers-then there must be some real-life justification for its efficacy. It is to 
this that I tum next. 
Ill. LADY ANNA AS AN ECONOMIC GAME 
Sir William's ethic of high expectations depends on the good will of his 
client and the client on the other side. For this ethic ever to be appropriate, there 
must be some basis for assuming that, under certain circumstances, clients will 
independently surrender rights in the interests of the broader good. In this Part, I 
draw upon insights from behavioral economics literature to offer such a basis. 
Specifically, I rely on evidence that people exhibit substantial tastes for fairness 
and reciprocity and that they respond to situations quite differently based on 
whether they perceive these situations as involving social norms or market 
norms. This evidence, which parallels Lady Anna in interesting respects, 
validates the practicality of the ethic of high expectations under certain 
conditions. 
A. Fairness and the Dictator Game 
An experiment known as "the dictator game" demonstrates that people have 
social preferences for fairness rather than being purely interested in maximizing 
their own profits
68 
The basic structure of the dictator game is quite simple. 
There are two players and a pot of money (say $10). The first player (the 
dictator) decides how to divide up the money, and then the money is divided up 
between the two players according to that allocation."' The game is played only 
once between the players. 70 
66. See infra Part IV.A. 
67. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.l (2010). 
68. See Robert Forsythe et al., Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments, 6 GAMEs & 
ECON. BEHAV. 347, 362...fi3 (1994). 
69. Id. at 350. 
70. Id. at 349. 
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If everyone was driven by pnre profit maximization, then in the dictator 
game the dictator would keep the entire pot of money. 71 In practice, a large 
percentage will in fact keep the entire pot, but the rest will give something to the 
other player, with a substantial minority giving fully half away. For example, in 
one study 36% of participants gave away nothing, 22% gave away au equal share 
or more, and the other 42% gave some amount in between.72 The decision to 
deviate from the ~urely selfish choice is thought to arise at least partially from 
norms of fairness. 3 
The evidence from the dictator game partially validates the practicality of Sir 
William's ethic of high expectations. Although it is hard to know how much 
carries over from the simple experimental setting, the dictator game provides an 
empirical basis for fmding it plausible rather thau wholly naive to expect that 
people are motivated by fairness, even in one-shot transactions where they face 
no repercussions from being greedy. Indeed, the second half of Lady Anna 
resembles a large-scale dictator game. Sir William effectively hypothesizes that 
after the case is dropped and the money is entirely in Lady Anna's hands, she 
will behave like a benevolent dictator aud offer a substantial portion of her 
fortune to the young Earl-even though, like the dictators in the dictator game, 
she is tmder no formal obligation to do so. Sir William guesses correctly, and in 
giving the young Earl half her money, Anna acts like the most generous of the 
dictators?4 
Two variants on the dictator game offer additional insights for the ethic of 
high expectations. First, studies show that the more dictators feel entitled to 
their money, the less willing they are to part with it. A dictator who becomes the 
dictator based on superior performance to the other player-such as a better 
score on a pop quiz--is significantly more stingy on average than a dictator who 
71. See id at 348. 
72. See id. at 362 (describing a $5 dictator game). In a $10 dictator game, 21% gave nothing, 
another 21% gave an equal share, and the rest gave an amount in-between. See id.; Elizabeth 
Hoffman et al., Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games, 86 AM. ECON. 
REV. 653, 653-54 & fig.l (1996) (testing six different variants of the $10 dictator game and finding 
that, depending on the variant, from 18% to 64% of dictators gave nothing, while between 8% and 
32% gave $4 or more). 
73. See Linda Babcock & Greg Pogarsky, Damage Caps and Settlement: A Behavioral 
Approach, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 341, 366--67 (1999) (finding in an experiment aimed at simulating 
settlement negotiations that people show preferences for fairness, although they are somewhat self-
interested in how they frame fairness); Forsythe, supra note 68, at 363; cf Colin Camerer & 
Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 209, 216 
(1995) ("We conclude that the outcomes of ultimatum, dictatorship and many other bargaining 
games have more to do with manners than altruism."). 
74. An interesting consideration, which I will not explore further, is how Anna's gender may 
relate to her benevolence as a dictator. One study of the dictator game has found that on average 
female dictators share twice as much as do male dictators. See Catherine C. Eckel & Philip J. 
Grossman, Are Women Less Selfish Than Men?: Evidence from Dictator Experiments, 108 ECON. J. 
726, 730 (1998). 
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is assigned to the role by chance."5 This fact has several implications for the 
ethic of high expectations. First, it implies that the ethic of high expectations is 
likely to be more effective in cases where people feel a lower sense of 
entitlement to the rights they are giving up. Second, it suggests that the ethic of 
high expectations has the greatest potential early on in cases. The more rulings 
there are by the court (e.g., on motions to dismiss or on summary judgment), the 
more entitled the winning party is likely to feel and thus the less likely it is to 
give rights up independently and voluntarily. 
A second set of variants on the dictator game shows that social distance 
affects the generosity of the dictator. Where the amount a dictator offers is 
unknown to everyone but the dictator, then dictators become stingier, with one 
study finding that fully 64% of dictators kept all the money76 By contrast, the 
more contact there is between the dictator and the experimenter, the more the 
dictator is likely to give.77 Similarly, the more the dictator knows about the 
recipient (e.g., name, photograph, face-to-face encounter), the more the dictator 
is likely to give.78 In some ways, this bodes well for the ethic of high 
expectations, as parties headed toward legal disputes are likely to know each 
other. Indeed, in Lady Anna, Sir William does not advise the young Earl to 
abandon the lawsuit (and thus trust Anna's generosity) until Anna and the young 
Earl have had ample time to get to know and like each other. But the amicable 
personal relations between Anna and the young Earl are undoubtedly far from 
the norm in cases that are litigated. It is unclear whether decreased social 
distance is an advantage where the social relations at issue are tense rather than 
neutral or positive. 
The dictator game thus provides modest support for the ethic of high 
expectations. It affirms the principle that many people will act altruistically out 
of a sense of fairness even when they are under no obligation to do so and would 
75. See Karl Schurter & Bart J. Wilson, Justice and Fairness in the Dictator Game, 76 S. 
ECON. J. 130, 133-34, 136 tbl.3 (2009) (finding that dictators gave away an average of 18% when 
picked based on seniority, 24% when picked based on superior performance on a quiz, 34% when 
picked by a dice roll, and 35% when assigned the role without explanation). 
76. Hoffman et al., supra note 72, at 653. 
77. See id. at 658 ("Our data supports the hypothesis that as social isolation increases there is 
a further shift toward lower offers."); cf Mary Rigdon et al., Minimal Social Cues in the Dictator 
Game, 30 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 358, 359 fig.l, 363 (2009) (finding that male dictators give more in 
the presence of three dots that look like "watching eyes" than in the presence of three dots arranged 
in a neutral shape). 
78. See Iris Bohnet & Bruno S. Frey, Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in 
Dictator Games 89 AM. ECON. REV. 335, 336-37 (1999) (finding that dictators offered more when 
they and the recipients were identified and told to make eye contact than when they did not lmow 
the identity of the recipients); Terence C. Burnham, Engineering Altruism: A Theoretical and 
Experimental Investigation of Anonymity and Gift Giving, 50 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 133, 136, 
138 tbl.l (2003) (finding that dictators give more when they see pictures of the second players); 
Gary Chamess & Uri Gneezy, What's in a Name? Anonymity and Social Distance in Dictator and 
Ultimatum Games, 68 J. ECON. BEHA V. & ORG. 29, 31, 32 tbl.l (2008) (finding that dictators gave a 
mean of approximately 27% where they lmew the family name of the second player but only 
approximately 18% where they did not know the name). 
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face no repercussions from doing otherwise. But the dictator game also raises 
concerns for the ethic of high expectations, since many dictators keep all the 
money to themselves, others give only a little, and variants on the study suggest 
that generosity will be more limited where dictators feel stronger senses of 
entitlement. Moreover, nothing about the dictator game suggests that it leads to 
better results for the second player than a bargain would. Indeed, in a similar 
game known as "the ultimatum game" in which the second player has the power 
to decline the first player's offer such that no one gets any money, the first 
players offer more money on average to the second players than they do in the 
dictator game79 If the ethic of high expectations ever has advantages over pure 
horse-trading, then support for these advantages must come from elsewhere. 
B. Reciprocity and the Trust Game 
An experiment called "the trust game" suggests that people have social 
preference for reciprocity. In this two-player game, which is similar to "the 
investment game," the first player (the investor) is given some amount of money 
(say $10). She can invest any amount of this money with the second player (the 
trustee). When the money goes to the trustee, it increases (say triples) in value, 
and the trustee can then decide how much, if any, to return to the investor80 In 
effect, once the investor has sent the money to the trustee, the trustee is in the 
same position as the dictator in the dictator game.'1 
If all actors acted out of pure self-interest, then trustees would keep all 
money sent to them.'2 And investors would anticipate this, so they would not 
send trustees any money in the first place. 83 In fact, investors typically send 
substantial amounts of their money to trustees, and trustees typically return 
substantial amounts back to investors.'4 In one study in which each investor had 
$10 and any part ofthat sent to the trustee would triple in value, investors sent an 
average of $5.16 to trustees, who returned an average of $4.66 to investors.85 Of 
the 28 trustees in this study who received money, there was wide variability in 
the responses: 12 sent back $0 or $1, II sent back more than the investors' initial 
79. See Camerer & Thaler, supra note 73, at 210, 213; Forsythe, supra note 68, at 349,362. 
80. See Joyce Berget al., Trost, Reciprocity, and Social History, 10 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 
122, 123 & n.l (1995) (citing David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in 
PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 90, 100 fig.l (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. 
Shepsle eds., 1990)). The trust game I describe here is played once between players, see id; it can 
be played multiple times as well, however. See Brooks King-Casas et al., Getting to Know You: 
Reputation and Trust in a Two-Person Economic Exchange, 308 SCI. MAG. 78, 78 (2005) (studying 
the changes in subjects over the course of repeated trust games). 
81. See Berget al., supra note 80, at 127. 
82. See id. at 126. 
83. See id. 
84. See id. at 131, 134. 
85. See id. at 124, 131; cf id. at 132, 134 (describing another experiment in which, after 
subjects were given information about the first experiment, the investors sent an average of $5.36 
and the trustees returned an average of $6.46). 
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investments, and the remaining 5 sent back money less than or equal to the initial 
investments. 86 Another study has found that trustees are significantly more 
willing to return money to the investors when the investors have voluntarily 
trusted them with money than when the investors have been required to invest 
money.87 These studies suggest that people are willing both to trust and to 
reciprocate, with reciprocation being stronger where trustees can infer that 
investors have trusted them. 
Lady Anna has even more parallels to the trust game than to the dictator 
game. The first half of Lady Anna is somewhat like the first stage of a trust 
game: the young Earl acts like a trusting investor in surrendering his own legal 
claim to the money and instead recognizing Anna's claim to it The results of 
the basic trust game provide support for Sir William's intuitions that the young 
Earl can be persuaded to act as he does (because most investors do in fact choose 
to make investments )88 and that Anna may reciprocate (because although many 
trustees keep all the money, many other trustees do reciprocate generously). As 
discussed earlier, Lady Anna does indeed prove to be a generous trustee/dictator 
and gives half her money to the young Earl. Her incentives to act this way not 
only include fairness as discussed earlier in relation to the dictator game but also 
reciprocity in response to the young Earl's trust in her. We then see one further 
round of the trust game, in which the young Earl reciprocates Anna's generosity 
by hosting her wedding and thus cementing her social place in the Love! family. 
In the trust game, trust and reciprocity help capture the potential increase in 
the investment despite the absence of any contract between the investor and the 
trustee.89 The absence of a contract in the trust game is due to necessity: there is 
no opportunity for the investor and the trustee to communicate other than 
through their money-transferring choices, and thus no opportunity to form a 
86. !d. at 131. 
87. See Kevin A. McCabe et al., Positive Reciprocity and Intentions in Trust Games, 52 J. 
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 267, 272 fig.3, 273 fig.4 (2003) (finding that in a study where trustees 
entrusted with $20 could either return $25 to the investor and keep $25 for themselves or return $15 
to the investor and keep $30 for themselves, 65% of trustees chose the generous $25/$25 approach 
where the investor had been given a choice about whether to make the $20 investment, while 67% 
of trustees chose the less generous $15/$30 approach where the investor had no choice but to make 
the $20 investment). 
88. See Berg et al., supra note 80, at 137 (noting that investors sent money fifty-five out of 
sixty times). Because the young Earl's likelihood of success on the legal merits is substantially 
weaker than Anna's, see LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 91, his "investment" further resembles the 
investments in the trust game in holding out the prospect of increased returns, see Berget al., supra 
note 80, at 124-25. 
89. Of course, reciprocity plays significant roles in the formation of contracts, including 
settlement agreements. See, e.g., Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles in 
Negotiating Civil Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOTIATIONL. REV. 1, 40--41,51-52 (1999) (discussing 
the psychological role of reciprocity in negotiating civil settlements); Russell Korobkin, A Positive 
Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789, 1822 (2000) ("A common negotiating tactic is to 
make an extreme opening offer, perhaps one that is far outside of the bargaining zone, in the hopes 
of then invoking the reciprocity norm to reach an advantageous deal point."). 
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contract.90 While this kind of situation can arise naturally, as shown in the facts 
of the famous case of Webb v. McGowin,91 in almost all cases involving lawyers, 
the parties will have ample chances to settle by contract. Thus, while the trust 
game provides more insights into why the ethic of high expectations might work 
in practice, it still does not show that the ethic of high expectations might 
sometimes be superior to a negotiated settlement. 
C. Market Norms and Social Norms 
An interesting line of experiments suggests that framing exchanges in social 
terms will sometimes generate better outcomes than framing exchanges as 
bargains. In a study that Dan Ariely and James Heyman conducted, participants 
were divided into three groups and asked to perform the same exercise over and 
over on the computer screen for five minutes, namely, dragging a circle into a 
square, at which point that circle would disappear and a new circle would 
appear.92 At the beginning of the experiment, one group's members were told 
they would be paid 50¢ for their time, one group's members were told they 
would be paid $5 for their time, and one group's members were asked to perform 
the exercise as a favor.93 Surprisingly, the third group-the group that was not 
paid-dragged the most circles on average (168), while the group paid $5 
dragged an average of 159 circles, and the group paid 50¢ dragged a measly 
average of 101 circles.94 
In explaining this result, Ariely considers that "we live simultaneously in 
two different worlds--{)ne where social norms prevail, and the other where 
market norms make the rnles."95 In the market world, "[t]he exchanges are 
sharp-edged ... [and] imply comparable benefits and prompt payments," while 
in the social world the ~Ieasure of giving and receiving favors and a sense of 
community motivate us. 6 In his experiment, the unpaid subjects outperformed 
the paid subjects because their social-world-based motivations were greater than 
the market-world-based motivations of the paid subjects (who, after all, were not 
being paid all that much). A real-life example comes from the AARP's attempt 
90. See Berget al., supra note 80, at 128-29. 
91. See Webb v. McGowin, 168 So. 196, 196-97 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935) (requiring an heir to 
continue making payments to a former employee of the decedent where, years earlier, the employee 
was seriously injured in saving the decedent's life and the decedent then promised to pay the 
employee a bi-weekly stipend for the rest of the employee's life). 
92. See DAN ARlELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL 69-70 (2008). 
93. See id. at 70. 
94. Id. at 70-71. A less contrived experiment by Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini reaches a 
similar result. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All, 115 Q.J. ECON. 
791, 798-800 (2000) (fmding that high school students asked to volunteer their time in collecting 
money for charity ended up collecting more than students who were paid for their time with a 
percentage of the donations). 
95. ARIELY, supra note 92, at 68. 
96. !d. 
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to find lawyers willing to represent needy retirees: When the AARP asked 
lawyers if they would be willing to take ou such clients at the reduced rate of $30 
an hour, the lawyers declined, but when asked to take on these clients for free, 
the lawyers agreed to do so.97 Ariely explains that the lawyers reacted in 
market-norm mode to the $30-an-hour proposal and accordingly did not think it 
was a good deal, but they reacted in social-norm mode to the request that they 
freely give their time and therefore responded generously.98 
In Lady Anna, Sir William can be described as moving the parties from 
market-norms mode into social-norms mode. At the beginning of the book, the 
discussions between the parties are purely in market terms, as shown by the 
attempt to get the Countess to surrender Anna's claim for 30,000 pounds. By the 
end of the book, however, Sir William has transitioned the parties' relations to 
the social sphere, and they have acted generously and high-mindedly towards 
each other. 
The differences between social norms and market norms also help explain 
two reasons why unnegotiated reciprocal gestures may, at times, be better than 
settlement agreements. First, it may be that such gestures can reduce transaction 
costs. The hassle and expense of litigation have always been with us: As 
George Sharswood put it long ago, "[i]t happens too often at the close of a 
protracted litigation that it is discovered, when too late, that the play has not been 
worth the candle, and that it would have been better, calculating everything, for 
the successful party never to have embarked in it-to have paid the claim, if 
defendant, or to have relinquished it, if he was plaintiff."99 While negotiated 
settlements can reduce transaction costs in comparison to litigation to final 
judgment, these costs can remain significant, particularly if there is a lot of pre-
settlement litigation, such as discovery or back-and-forth dming the settlement 
process. Moreover, people are prone to biases that make settlement more 
difficult to achieve. Among other things, they suffer from what economists call 
"a self-serving bias-to conflate what is fair with what benefits onesel("100 I 
have not seen studies on whether people are less prone to these biases when 
acting in social mode than when in market mode, but that might well be the case. 
In any event, unnegotiated reciprocal gestures with regard to certain aspects of a 
case may reduce transaction costs for a negotiated settlement of the remainder 
(for example, by increasing trnst). 101 
97. See id. at 71. 
98. See id 
99. SHARSWOOD, supra note 3, at 52~53. 
100. See Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of 
Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 110 (1997). Recognition of this bias existed well 
before the term "self-serving bias" was coined. See SHARSWOOD, supra note 3, at 51 ("(I]t is often 
very hard to persuade a man that he has not the best side of a lawsuit: his interest blinds his 
judgment .... "). 
101. See Korobkin, supra note 89, at 1830 (noting that trust increases negotiating power). 
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Second, and more significantly, unnegotiated reciprocal gestures can 
generate surplus. In the unpaid version of Ariely's study, everyone is better off 
than in the paid version: the experimenters get their circles dragged for free, 
while the subjects gain satisfaction from doing the favor that is greater than the 
satisfaction of the subjects who make $5 or 50¢ (as shown by their comparative 
work ethics).102 In Lady Anna, similarly, the move from market mode to social 
mode creates surplus. It is possible to imagine a bargain that "I won't contest 
your legitimacy if you give me half the money." But such a bargain would leave 
whispers open about Anna's legitimacy and would hardly further close family 
relations. 
Surplus from non-market exchanges can arise even in the course of 
relationships that are largely market-based. In a seminal paper, George Akerlof 
proposed the idea that labor markets can involve partial gift exchanges
103 
Akerlof was trying to explain why a group of workers with little chance of 
promotion worked harder than the minimum work standards (though with 
substantial variation across workers )104 Akerlof concluded that the best 
explanation was that the workers developed "sentiment" for their company such 
that they gave the "gift" of superior work, and the company in return ?ave them 
the gift of wages above what they might have received elsewhere.
10 
Akerlof 
convincingly explains why this added exchange should be viewed not as a 
contract but as the exchange of reciprocal gifts and further whl, this reciprocal 
exchange of gifts benefits both the company and the workers. 
1 6 
While not all 
market relationships will incorporate such social norms, and while not all social 
norms will create surplus, 107 the widespread mixing of market and social norms 
does provide further support for the feasibility of the ethic of high 
expectations. 108 
102. See ARIELY, supra note 92, at 70--71. 
103. See George A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts as Partial Gifl Exchange, 97 Q.J. ECON. 543, 
549 (1982). 
104. See id. at 543. 
105. !d. at 543-44. 
106. See id. at 549-55. Evidence of the mixing of market norms and social norms has been 
observed in settings as widely varied as day care arrangements and firefighter benefits. See Uri 
Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15 (2000) (discussing how 
introducing fines for late child pickup in dayMcare centers increased the amount of late pickups); 
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment, 
108 MICH. L. REV. 633, 636 (2010) (discussing issue in the context of firefighters' sick-leave 
policy). 
107. See Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 106, at 664---65 (arguing that liquidated damages clauses 
can promote efficient breach by moving parties from a social norm against breaking agreements to a 
market norm). 
I 08. Moreover, this surplus can disappear through the process of settlement negotiations 
through a phenomenon known as "crowding out." See id at 665. The very act of trying to bargain 
over or monetize something viewed as a social norm can cause people to change their views and 
treat it as something in the market sphere. See ARIELY, supra note 92, at 77; Gneezy & Rustichini, 
supra note 106, at 14; cf Richard Birke, Neuroscience and Settlement: An Examination of Scientific 
Innovations and Practical Applications, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 477, 510 (2010) 
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The dictator game, the trust game, and studies on social norms and market 
norms do not fully validate Sir William's decisions. Not all dictators are 
benevolent; not all people trust or are worthy of trust in the trust game; and 
social norms will not affect parties to many cases. Nonetheless, these 
experiments provide some support to the ethic of high expectations and offer 
insights into when it can succeed. They suggest that fairness, trust, and 
reciprocity can sometimes occur without negotiated agreements among complete 
strangers and that unconditional reciprocal exchanges can sometimes generate 
better results than formal contracts. They thus suggest that, at times, the ethic of 
high expectations can "temper[] the innocence of the dove with the wisdom of 
the serpent."109 The trick is determining when it can do so. 
IV. THE ETHIC OF HIGH EXPECTATIONS IN PRACTICE 
In the prior parts, I have defined the ethic of high expectations and argued 
that insights from behavioral economics provide qualified support for its 
feasibility. In this Part, I consider the circumstances under which the ethic of 
high expectations might be effective in lawyering today. I look first at 
characteristics of cases where the ethic of high expectations may apply, and then 
identify three sample areas of law where these characteristics can be found. 
In considering possible applications of the ethic of high expectations today, I 
include weaker applications of this ethic than that which occurs in Lady Anna. 
While Lady Anna provides a crisp (and delightful) illustration of the ethic of 
high expectations, we cannot expect many cases where one party voluntarily 
abandons all legal claims at issue, the other side generously reciprocates by 
splitting wealth evenly with the first party, and the two sides have cordial 
relationships thereafter. Nor can we expect many lawyers to have the greatness 
of Sir William Patterson. Accordingly, I include situations where a client on one 
side could unilaterally and unconditionally abandon only certain rights (rather 
than all relevant rights) in the hope of triggering a similar gesture of reciprocity 
from the client on the other side that furthers a good outcome. 
My understanding of the ethic of high expectations is otherwise the same as 
discussed in Part Il.B above. In particular, it includes three limitations that I 
hinted at in that section, but which I will specify in more detail here. First, the 
right at issue should be one that lies primarily with the client rather than the 
lawyer. In the course of most litigations, lawyers make unilateral and 
unconditional concessions to each other-for example, in not opposing requests 
for extensions of time1 10 -that promote civility and mutual appreciation and may 
(discussing the pressure to monetize all interests in the course of settlement negotiations). It then 
becomes hard to return the matter to its original social-norm status. See ARIELY, supra note 92, at 
77; Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 106, at 14. 
109. LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 113. 
110. Indeed, standards of ethics often require such courtesies. See, e.g., OKLA. BAR ASS'N, 
STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM § 3.4(a) (2006), available at http://www.okbar.org/ethics/ 
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therefore reduce both the cost and the stress of litigation. But such modest 
gestures lie between lawyers and do not involve expectations for either a 
lawyer's client or the client on the opposing side. Second, the abandonment of 
the right should be unilateral and unconditional. The experimental evidence I 
discussed above relating to fairness and reciprocity has relevance in the context 
of best tactics and conditional offers in settlement negotiations, and there is 
indeed substantial literature on how lawyers can make use of social greferences 
for fairness and reciprocity in the course of settlement negotiations. 11 But the 
ethic of high expectations as I have defined it is about unconditional gestures of 
trust. Third, the abandonment should come with the expectation of a reciprocal 
gesture from the other party. Many reasons exist for lawyers to counsel clients 
to abandon rights-as where the likely costs are not worth the likely gains or 
where exercise of the rights would be morally indefensible."2 Indeed, Elihu 
Root reportedly once said that "[a ]bout half the practice of a decent lawyer is 
telling would-be clients that they are damned fools and should stop."113 But my 
interest here is in reciprocity and in when lawyers should counsel clients to 
abandon legal rights in the hopes of benefiting from reciprocal gestures. 
A. Circumstances Lending Themselves to the Ethic of High Expectations 
A song about gambling advises, "You got to know when to hold 'em, know 
when to fold 'em, know when to walk away and know when to run."ll4 As with 
good gamblers, good lawyers must have the judgment to play their cards well, 
and this is particularly true of lawyers who seek to invoke the ethic of high 
expectations. Like acting as a "lawyer for the situation," practicing the ethic of 
high expectations is "a tricky business ... requir[ing] skill, nerve, detachment, 
compassion, ingenuity, and the capacity to sustain confidence.""' It goes 
against the conventional grain of adversariallawyering and will draw every eye 
for its daring. If it succeeds, as with Sir William, it is likely to succeed 
spectacularly, but if it fails, then it is likely to fail with a bang. 
standards.htm ("We will agree, consistent with existing law and court orders, to reasonable requests 
for extensions of time when the legitimate interests of our clients will not be adversely affected."); 
SANTA CLARA CNTY. BAR ASS'N, CODE OF PROFESSIONALISM § 4 (2007), available at 
http://www.sccba.com/aboutlprofessionalism.cfm ("Consistent with existing law and court orders, a 
lawyer should agree to reasonable requests for extensions of time when the legitimate interests of 
his or her client will not be adversely affected."). 
111. See, e.g., Birkc & Fox, supra note 89, at 40--41, 51-52 (discussing the psychological role 
of reciprocity in negotiating civil settlements); Korobkin, supra note 89, at 1830 (discussing the role 
of the reciprocity norm in legal negotiation). 
112. Stephen Gillers, Is Law (Still) an Honorable Profession?, 19 PROF'L LAWYER, no. 2, 
2009 at 23, 25. 
113. Id. at 25 (citing Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 730 F.2d 1476, 1486 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 
1984)). 
114. KENNY ROGERS, The Gambler, on THE GAMBLER (United Artists 1978). 
115. HAZARD, supra note 3, at 65. 
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In deciding whether a particular situation lends itself to the ethic of high 
expectations, there is no substitute for good judgment. But good judgment does 
not lend itself to characterization, and I will not attempt that here. Instead, what 
I offer here is meant as a supplement to good judgment: namely, three 
characteristics that are usually necessary for the competent exercise of the ethic 
of high expectations. 
First, the ethic of high expectations must offer hope of value for both sides 
beyond what a negotiated settlement could provide. If a negotiated settlement 
will do the trick, then there is no reason for a lawyer to invoke the ethic of high 
expectations and all its attendant risks. As I discussed in Part IILC, however, the 
ethic of high expectations can sometimes reduce transaction costs or generate 
surplus beyond what a negotiated agreement would do. Unconditional partial 
gestures can also at times jump-start negotiations, as has graven the case in 
matters as significant as the Northern Ireland peace process. '6 For the ethic of 
high expectations to be advisable, a lawyer must believe that it offers one or 
more of these advantages over a negotiated agreement and that the client could 
receive at least some of the benefits of these advantages. 
Second, both parties must share a sense of a broader good. At a minimum, 
they should both think that there is a fair outcome that is not fully in line with 
their own interests, even if they do not agree on exactly what this fair outcome 
looks like. More powerfully, they should recognize that the situation is one 
where positive value will come out of reciprocity, and they should be willing to 
relate in social-norms mode as opposed to just market-norms mode. Only if a 
lawyer has reason to believe that both parties share a sense of the broader 
good-and therefore that the opposing party is likely to behave like a 
trustworthy trustee in the trust game-should the lawyer invoke the ethic of high 
expectations. By invoking the ethic of high expectations, the lawyer also 
increases the odds that the parties will live it up to it. Just as people are more 
likely to play cooperatively in a game if it is called the "Community Game" 
rather than the "Wall Street Game,"117 so they are more likely to fulfill high 
expectations if they are in fact confronted with these expectations. 
Third, communication between the parties and the lawyers must be strong, 
clear, and respectful. For the ethic of high expectations to work in practice, the 
lawyer must first have a client who is willing to listen to advice that goes beyond 
the four comers of the law. But this is just the beginning. The lawyer must also 
116. See Christine Bell, Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status, 100 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 373, 376-377 (2006) (discussing the role of the Downing Street Declaration in the Northern 
Ireland peace process). 
117. See Varda Liberman et al., The Name of the Game: Predictive Power of Reputations 
Versus Situational Labels in Determining Prisoner's Dilemma Game Moves, 30 PERSONALITY & 
Soc. PSYCHOL. BuLL. 1175, 1177 {2004) ("It is equally clear that the name of the game exerted a 
considerable effect on the participants' choices. When playing the Community Game, 67% of the 
most likely to cooperate nominees and 75% of the most likely to defect nominees cooperated on the 
first round. When playing the Wall Street Game, 33% of participants with each nomination status 
cooperated .... "). 
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have good relations with the lawyer on the other side (or the other party if 
\Ulfepresented). If opposing counsel seems unlikely to act in a manner 
sympathetic to the ethic of high expectations, this ethic is unlikely to work. And 
because our ethical rules prevent lawyers from communicating directly with 
represented parties as freely as did Sir William, 118 the lawyer also needs 
confidence that the party on the other side will have a clear understanding of 
what is going on and feel some pressure to make a reciprocal gesture. This 
confidence could come from direct communication in the course of meetings 
between all parties and lawyers, from client-to-client communications, or from a 
belief that the lawyer for the other party will present matters to her client in a 
way that furthers the ethic of high expectations. As the variants on the dictator 
game and the trust game suggest, the party on the other side is more likely to act 
generously if there is less social distance between the parties and if that party 
understands clearly that the other party has placed trust in her. 119 Finally, 
relations between the clients should be respectful. The parties will probably not 
be on good terms with each other-indeed, the ethic of high expectations is 
pm1ly about bringing the pm1ies to such terms-but strong personal dislike or 
distrust likely makes all but the smallest gestures of trust unfeasible. 
It may seem rare indeed that these three conditions are met. The first 
condition runs contrary to the classic view of litigation as a zero-smn game; 120 
the second condition calls for positive views of clients in contradiction to the 
''bad man" assumption that underlies much of legal reasoning; 121 and the third 
condition requires cordial communications between legal adversaries. A lawyer 
may well think that these conditions are so unlikely to he met in practice that it is 
not worth ever considering the matter-particularly if that lawyer is reluctant to 
think "outside the box" or is overly cautious about the risk of malpractice 
suits. 122 But as I will suggest in the next section, these conditions occur more 
often than one might think, especially in certain areas of law. Indeed, the ethic 
118. See supra Part Il.C. 
119. See supra Part II.A-B. 
120. See Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 16 (1998). 
121. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,459 (1897) 
("lf you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only 
for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who 
fmds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of 
conscience."); cf Katherine R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETlilCS 103, 104 (2010) ("In the world of legal ethics, clients are most often constructed as 
cardboard figures interested solely in maximizing their own wealth or freedom at the expense of 
others."). But see Charles Fried, The Lmryer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-
Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1088 (1976) (examining the case of the lawyer who has a bad 
client, although acknowledging that "in ve1y many situations a lawyer will be advising a client who 
wants to effectuate his purposes within the law, to be sure, but who also wants to behave as a 
decent, moral person"). 
122. I say "overly" because a lawyer who practices the ethic of high expectations properly will 
lay out its risks clearly to the client and therefore have a good shield against a possible malpractice 
suit in the event that the other side fails to reciprocate. 
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of high expectations is already flourishing in some areas and has potential to be 
used more widely in others. 
B. Some Contexts in Which the Ethic of High Expectations Could Apply 
The ethic of high expectations could apply in many different contexts. At 
the transactional stage, the company lawyer might remind her client that, along 
the lines of Akerlof's argument, paying wages above the going rate can lead to 
even more valuable increases in worker productivity under the right 
conditions. 123 This lawyer might also urge her client to make good on a disputed 
loss with a long-time buyer in the hope that the buyer will then remain a loyal 
customer. Because social norms play a significant role in ordinary business 
dealings, advice that takes these norms heavily into account should hardly 
occasion much controversy. 
The ethic of high expectations proves more interesting in cases that are in 
litigation or headed there. Of course, there are some areas of law where a lawyer 
will virtually always be better off focusing on traditional settlement rather than 
on the ethic of high expectations-such as in straight commercial disputes 
between parties with no continuing relationship. In other areas of law, however, 
a lawyer would do well to consider invoking the ethic of high expectations as a 
substitute or supplement to settlement. I briefly identity three such areas here. 
I. Government Investigations of Corporations 
Perhaps the most common use of the ethic of high expectations occurs in 
relation to government investigations into corporate behavior. On receiving 
notice of government investigations in the antitrust or securities context, lawyers 
now routinely encourage their clients to cooperate from the start. 124 They often 
do so without explicit deals but with the hope that the government will 
reciprocate down the road by dropping the investigation or accepting a more 
modest settlement than it would if confronted with full- fledged adversarial 
resistance. 125 
These cases typically satisf'y the criteria I identified in the prior section. 
Corporate cooperation followed by governmental leniency can lower transaction 
costs bl reducing the amount of legal work that both sides have to put into a 
case. 12 It also generally increases surplus for the company because cooperation 
123. See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text. 
124. See Sarah Helene Duggin, The McNulty Memorandum, the KPMG Decision and 
Corporate Cooperation: Individual Rights and Legal Ethics, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 341, 344-47 
(2008). 
125. See id at 371-72; cf Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate 
Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 311, 321-26 (2007) (discussing use of deferred prosecution 
agreements, which are specific contracts). 
126. See Griffin, supra note 125, at 340-42. 
1
:. 
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is better than resistance from a reputational standpoint, and for the govermnent 
because it would prefer that companies shape up rather than be driven out of 
business-' 27 In terms of the broader good, the govermnent clearly has an interest 
in this principle, 128 and companies presumably desire to act legally either out of 
principle or reputational interests. Lines of communication will probably be 
strong, particularly because government attorneys act as proxies for their 
client. 129 
Because the government is a repeat player with long-term incentives, 
corporate lawyers can have substantial confidence that the govermnent will 
reciprocate cooperative gestures. 130 Indeed, official govermnent 
pronouncements make clear that cooperation will be rewarded.131 The incentives 
for corporations to cooperate are extremely strong-so strong that their 
voluntariness has been questioned and adversarial resistance has been recognized 
th . ki 131 as e ns er strategy. 
2. Divorce 
The movie Wedding Crashers begins with a scene from a divorce 
mediation. 133 The parties are at· an angry stand-still until the mediators ask what 
the wedding was like.134 The parties soften, and suddenly the husband offers the 
frequent flyer miles to the wife-a gesture that opens the door to resolution of 
the entire case. 135 
127. See id. at 327, 330 (citing Press Release, Dep't of Justice, America Online Charged with 
Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud; Prosecution Deferred for Two Years (Dec. 15, 2004), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/December/04_crm_790.htm) (explaining how, particularly in the 
wake of the collapse of Arthur Anderson, companies wish to avoid indictments and the government 
wishes to avoid inflicting significant harm). 
128. See id. 
129. See generally Kimberly E. O'Leary, When Context Matters: How To Choose an 
Appropriate Client Counseling Model, 4 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 103, 106, l 14 
(200 1) (discussing how some govemment attomeys act in a traditional manner as a proxy for their 
clients). 
130. See Griffin, supra note 125, at 316. 
131. See id. at 316-21 (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, CORPORATE CRIME IN AMERICA: 
STRENGTHENING THE "GOOD CITIZEN" CORPORATION 19 (1995), available at http://www.ussc. 
gov/Research!Symposium _Proceedings/Corporate_ Crime/WCSYMPO _opt. pdf); Memorandum 
from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., on Principles of Federal Prosecutions of Business 
Organizations 7, available at http:www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf; 
Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., on Principles of Federal Prosecutions 
of Business Organizations 7 (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/business _ 
organizations. pdf. 
132. See Duggin, supra note 124, at 345 ("[R]esitance is not always futile, but it may be 
fatal"); Griffin, supra note 125, at 313, 333--40, 351 (citing Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, 
supra note 131, at 10) (raising concerns that incentives for companies to cooperate are so strong that 
the rights of individual employees are banned). 
133. WEDDING CRASHERS (New Line Cinema 2005). 
134. See id. 
135. See id 
---
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This fictional example sheds light on the very mixed potential for the ethic 
of high expectations in divorce cases. On the one hand, the parties are likely to 
start with acrimonious personal relations and deep skepticism as to each other's 
fairness and trustworthiness. On other hand, divorce cases have perhaps the 
most to gain in terms of surplus from unnegotiated reciprocal gestures that build 
trust, since a good relationship with a former spouse has significant 
psychological value to a client and will prove of enormous assistance in easing 
their continuing connections, especially if there are children. 136 Traditional 
lawyering does little to create this surplus; indeed, lawyers can even ~o so far as 
to advise clients that they should try to "screw" their former spouses. 1 7 
A recent trend known as "collaborative law" tries to steer divorcing parties 
toward trusting and respecting relations in ways that bear similarities to the ethic 
of high expectations." In collaborative law, the lawyers and parties commit to 
good-faith negotiations, to the disclosure of all relevant information even if not 
requested, and to switching to new counsel should either party decide to 
litigate. 139 Clients who go through this process point to the impact on the 
children as their main reason for doing so, 140 suggesting that they recognize the 
surplus that comes from a comparatively amicable divorce process. 
The development of collaborative divorce demonstrates that at least in some 
cases, divorcing parties can draw upon principles of fairness, trust, and 
reciprocity, and indeed some want to do so. The unconditional surrender of 
certain interests by one party (even, Wedding Crashers suggests, interests as 
small as frequent flyer miles) may well generate reciprocal gestures and move 
the case toward a more successful resolution from all perspectives. 
3. Personal Injury 
The ethic of high expectations may also have potential in personal injury 
cases. A much-cited example involves the Veterans Affairs Medical Center 
136. See generally Gwyneth I. Williams, Looking at Joint Custody Through the Language and 
Attitudes of Attorneys, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 1, 5-6 (2005) (discussing benefits of amicable settlements in 
divorce cases). 
137. Austin Sarat & William L. F. Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of 
Motive in Lawyer/Client Interaction, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 737, 757 (1988) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (describing a conversation between a lawyer and client in which the client expresses 
an interest in making concessions and the lawyer responds that if she does that, she'll "have 40, 50, 
60 years to say, 'Gee whiz, why didn't I want to screw him?"'). 
138. See William H. Schwab, Collaborative Lawyering: A Closer Look at an Emerging 
Practice, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 351, 358 (2004). 
139. See id. 
140. See id. at 378 ("To gain insight into what interests clients bring to the process, they were 
presented with eight possible factors and asked to rank these in order of importance to their decision 
to try [collaborative law]. The most frequently ranked factor was 'impact on children,' selected by 
44% of clients .... "). 
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(Center) in Lexington, Kentucky141 In 1987, the Center switched from a "deny 
and defend" approach to medical errors to a policy of apologizing for errors and 
in certain cases offering compensation/42 a change that has saved the Center 
money. 143 Here, we see the ethic of high expectations in operation: the apology 
has created surplus by its psychological benefits, reduced transaction costs by 
making the parties more trusting and thus more likely to settle earlier, promoted 
principles of fairness, and helped the parties have relatively good relations. 
Several other hospitals have adopted a similar approach with similar results. 144 
At least one set of studies suggests that apologies will also reduce the amount of 
monetary compensation plaintiffs deem adequate in personal injury contexts 
other than medical malpractice. 145 In sum, although more studies and examples 
would be valuable, there is reason to think that the ethic of high expectations can 
k . I . h I . . 146 wor as a prac!Jca matter m t e persona mJury context. 
In identifying these three subject areas, I do not mean to suggest that all 
cases within these areas will prove good candidates for the ethic of high 
expectations. Nor do I mean to suggest that the ethic of high expectations carmot 
be invoked in other areas of law. Rather, I offer these three very different areas 
as examples of when the ethic of high expectations will sometimes serve the 
lawyers and the parties well. 
141. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Cohen, The Culture of Legal Denial, 84 NEB. L. REV. 247, 257-58 
(2005) (discussing the Veterans Affair Medical Center example); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, 
Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement Negotiation, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 349, 360 (2008) 
(same); Jonathan Todres, Toward Healing and Restoration for All: Reframing Medical Malpractice 
Reform, 39 CONN. L. REV. 667,714 n.232 (2006) (citing SteveS. Kraman et al., John M Eisenberg 
Patient Safety Awards: Advocacy: The Lexington Veterans Affairs Medical Center, 28 JOTNT 
COMMISSION J. QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 646, 646 (2002)) (same). 
142. See Cohen, supra note 141, at 257-58 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Jonathan 
R. Cohen, Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example from Medical Practice, 27 FORDHAM 
URB. L.l. 1447, 1451-53 (2000)); Robbennolt, supra note 141, at 360. 
143. See Cohen, Apology and Organizations, supra note 142, at 1453 (noting that since the 
change, the Center has had relatively low overall payouts compared to other veterans' medical 
centers and that its cases have comparatively low litigation costs because they settle quickly). 
144. See Robbennolt, supra note 141, at 360. Robbennolt also provides an interesting 
discussion about the rise of state laws limiting or excluding the use of apologies in litigation. See 
id. at 356-57. 
145. See id. at 361-63 (citing Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An 
Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 484, 515 (2003); Jennifer K. Robbenolt, Apologies 
and Settlement Levers, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 333, 341 (2006)) (describing a set of studies in 
which participants were asked to assume that they were injured in a pedestrian-bicycle collision and 
noting that apologies "influence[d] judgments that [were] directly related to legal settlement 
decision making"). 
146. One further experiment by Robbennolt suggests that while injured persons may be 
willing to accept less monetary compensation where they have also received an apology, plaintiffs' 
attorneys do not view apologies as reducing the appropriate settlement value-indeed, if the 
apologies are admissible evidence, they view these apologies as increasing the settlement value. 
See id. at 376-77. This experiment suggests that plaintiffs' attorneys either consider that plaintiffs 
should get all the benefits of the surplus generated by the apology or do not view the apologies as 
generating surplus. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
There is an old story of an English barrister who, upon hearing that a 
contentious inheritance dispute had settled, exclaimed in disgust, "Settled! 
Settled! Think of it! All that magnificent estate frittered away on the 
beneficiaries."147 This cynical view is just one of conntless negative portrayals 
of lawyers from ancient times to the present. 148 But against the cynics lies an 
equally long line of defenders of the legal profession, many of whom are not 
only lawyers but also great historical figures. To give but two examples, 
Abraham Lincoln considered that "[a ]s a peacemaker[,] the lawyer has a superior 
opportunity of being a good man,"149 and Louis Brandeis claimed that the 
practice of law offers "an opportunity for usefulness which is probably 
unequalled."150 
In Sir William Patterson, Anthony Trollope has given us a model of the 
lawyer-as-peacemaker par excellence: a "lawyer's lawyer, one to whom most 
other lawyers, past middle age, with ambition, ideals and common sense, would 
point as representing what they themselves would like to be."151 Unlike the 
barrister in the story above, Sir William seeks a resolution that will do the most 
for the parties and the least for the lawyers. His methods are also nnlike that of 
the barrister in the storyC-cwhile that barrister relishes the prospect of a court 
battle, Sir William succeeds by moving the parties away from litigation through 
his ethic of high expectations. 
I have suggested in this Essay that lawyers today have something to gain 
from studying Sir William's tactics. Long before dictator games, trust games, 
and formal distinctions between social norms and market norms, Trollope used 
Sir William to show that sometimes the best result for a client can be obtained by 
stepping away from legal rights and explicit negotiations and instead focusing 
the parties on principles of fairness, trust, and reciprocity. Even if it is only 
pulled out in a modest subset of cases, this ethic of high expectations belongs in 
every lawyer's briefcase. 
147. JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 62 (Victor Gollancz Ltd. 1938) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also HAZARD, supra note 3, at 133 (telling this story with slightly different wording). 
148. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 WM. & MARY L. 
REv. 283, 283-89 (1998) (recounting numerous examples of negative perspectives on lawyers 
starting with the ancient Greeks). 
149. Abraham Lincoln, Fragment: Notes for a Law Lecture, in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 81, 81 (RoyP. Basler ed., 1953). 
150. Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, Address before the Harvard Ethical 
Committee (May 4, 1905), in LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, BUSINESS: A PROFESSION 313, 327 (August M. 
Kelley reprint 1971) (I914). 
151. Drinker, supra note 5, at 56. 
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